Speaker 1 (00:00:00):

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to yet another part of this epic brain Fest. I hope your neurons and synapses are in fine working order. Let me introduce first, David Brooks. Want to tell a bit about David? You'll remember she won't but we had him on LNL and he was something of a hit, he was one of the most eloquent and articulate conservatives I'd ever actually met damning with faint praise and he's he's made quite a storm in conservative circles in the U S with an article he wrote last year with a colleague from the weekly standard William crystal in the piece, which was published in the wall street journal. They argued for a new approach to the Republican party. The idea is if you like to go for national greatness, big picture republicanism, the Republicans claim to be United by an anti government, creed, and deeply divided what it means to be anti-government.

Speaker 1 (00:01:01):

But Brooks and crystal suggested the Republicans give up the pretense of they're consistently antigovernment. Instead, the parties should ask what limited but energetic government could do. This brings up notions of Roosevelt Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, perhaps. Anyway, I think you'll find him exhilarating company. We have the brat pack from Sydney. We have Katherine Lumby and Mackenzie walk, who are a formidable duo. I regard them as a sort of a double act. I was going to say like Abbott and Costello, but that means something different now, doesn't it. But they are in F in invariably provocative and very members trying to look up and see what books they've written lately. They write books on an hourly basis. These two Catherine of course, is a journo and columnist for the SMH and the age. She is director of media and communications at Sydney university, senior writer for the bulletin.

Speaker 1 (00:01:59):

So she puts herself around a bit her books, bad girls, the media, sex, and feminism, and that was published in 1997. But this one after that, isn't it. Gotcha. Gotcha. Gotcha. Right now Mackenzie also has books like other people's shed PS. His most recent book is celebrities culture and cyberspace published by Pluto with Brad Miller. He produced the multimedia CD rom I don't know what a CD rom is, but he produced one called planet of noise. And his column appears in the higher education supplement of the Australian. You're not, you're not even allowed to read his column unless you've got a tertiary degree. And McKenzie is also a senior lecturer in media studies and Macquarie university, and is from time to time a visiting professor at NYU. Then there's this woman sitting here who is, of course, since the resignation of Margaret Thatcher, the most powerful woman in British politics.

Speaker 1 (00:03:05):

Beatrix Campbell. Lovely to see you again, blue drinks, you're holding up. Okay boy, are they working? Beatrix now the subject is truth in media. Whom should I believe? Well, I simplified this by simply believing in Jared Henderson. Well, no, I I've got time to read a lot. So I've chosen one columnist. I also believe in Paddy McGuinness, but I can't be bothered reading him. And but we're going to find out whom we should believe truth in the media, the media and its role in a vibrant democracy. And we're going to do it from at the table. Each of the distinguished panelists will, what do you reckon? 10 minutes each. Can you all handle that 10 20, 30, 15, and your case, Catherine, catch your talk faster 10 minutes, but talk fast and that'll leave more time for David who being a conservative will just have better constructed sentences. Ladies and gentlemen, let's get stuck into it. I don't know who to believe. We'll find out from Catherine, David, McKenzie and Beatrix. And Beatrix your first cab off the rank

McKenzie Wark (00:04:23):

[Inaudible]

Beatrix Campbell (00:04:27):

I was thinking about a wonderful film called illustrious corpses that was made, I believe in the 1970s. And it's about the murders of a series of Christian Democrat judges in Italy. Anyway, at the center of the story, there is a cop under journalist and the movie really is focused on the relationship between these two, the cop being Mr. Decent investigator, trying to work out a pattern of these murders. And the journalist is the person who he transmits the story to in the hope that he will tell it. And in the hope, therefore that there will stop because he clocks at certain point that far from these being the murders perpetrated by red terrorists, they're actually being perpetrated by right-wing fascists who are trying to destabilize democracy in Italy. Right? And there's a wonderful moment at the end of the movie, a Dan Newmont in a building somewhat like this when the Mr.

Beatrix Campbell (00:05:32):

Decent cop is astonished and thwarted and upset when Mr. Radical journalist says to him something to the effect of, well, there's nothing I can do with this story. And the man says, yeah, but, you know, but, but this is the truth. It's about the truth. And he says, there's no such thing as revolutionary truth. So what the, what the journalist registers in his conversation with the detective is that the truth, the story only has meaning. And he only has weight in a way that is contingent it's contingent on the character and confidence and strength of the democracy that it informs. So I suppose what that is a clue to is the symbiotic relationship between the political system and the media system. So with that thought, which goes absolutely nowhere except to say that that they are indeed symbiotic. I thought that it might be useful just to ruminate on a couple of three examples of I suppose the problem of thinking about a theme like this one, one of the things that's happened in British journalism over the last two decades is the dramatic decline straight political with a big P parliamentary coverage.

Beatrix Campbell (00:06:59):

There is virtually no daily parliamentary coverage, any longer in the British press. This isn't because the British press is crap, but it is however, because the British press in a certain sense has walked away from a place that has become empty.

Beatrix Campbell (00:07:18):

The decline of parliamentary coverage. In other words is an effect of the decline of parliament. That's the first example. There's a bot to that example, which is that in the last couple of weeks, there's been a dramatic challenge to the government and to the parliamentary process over the introduction of a new proposed law on freedom of information, very important for the British press. Cause obviously that sets its territory. And I can't think of as dramatic a challenge to the government's practices in between the publication of a white paper and a piece of legislation and absolutely forensic piece of investigative political journalism in a very, very long time, that would compare to the investigation of the government's presentation of it, a freedom of information strategy, indeed, the collapse of its pledges on opening up our institutions to the scrutiny and gaze of the mass media.

Beatrix Campbell (00:08:26):

What's interesting about that is that that wasn't engineered by any political constituency. It was engineered by the press itself. I mean, I suppose you could say, well, at one level they would wouldn't they at another level, it's a measure of the significance for our, for our democracy, for the functioning of

it, of a democracy of a media that has a forensic imagination, but this is going to be a series of bots, but think about our coverage of Northern Ireland. And what we see is a disposition, which is defined really by Westminster, by the political composition of over the house of commons and by the, the, the drift, if you like, of the government's own intentions, there's very little sense in our mainstream mass media coverage of Northern Ireland of a commitment to interrogate the conditions of Northern Ireland, that would be equivalent to our commitment to say, interrogate the conditions of, I don't know, Serbia or Australia.

Beatrix Campbell (00:09:36):

In other words, there's an orientation towards Northern Ireland, which is shrouded by defined by the disposition of the government itself. There is no other agenda. There is no other story to tell occasionally there will be, and this is is only occasional, there'll be an interest in things like bloody Sunday things like the terrible conditions of of said the prisoners. But there's a, there's a, there's a remarkable symmetry between the, the feeling, if you like of political society in mainland Britain and the way in which Northern Ireland is covered by the mass media. Partly I think that it needs another phrase to that. Partly it's that, you know, in Britain were quite racist about the Irish and it wouldn't therefore be, I suppose, surprising that we would tend to view what goes on in Northern Ireland as something that's barely worth investigating because it's only these land people killing each other and very hairy, yes, you'll only get the drug if you were there last night.

Beatrix Campbell (00:10:51):

A very different example of the paradoxical behavior of of our media is its relationship to children. And to try and abuse maybe 10 years ago, the relationship of the British state towards children changed dramatically. The British state very explicitly took the side of children in adversity in a completely new way. What that unleashed was, was a relationship to children's experience and children's narratives that was unprecedented briefly only in the sense that in a way that revealed the ways in which store has become tellable and in what conditions stories are not tellable, and indeed are not knowable for instance, journalists in the main, whether they're television journalists or print journalists. And I'm interested to see whether the other journalists here feel the same, our relationship to these kinds of stories is always contingent on access to the person who is the storyteller in the case of children, of course, particularly children who may be awesomely oppressed.

Beatrix Campbell (00:12:13):

It's rare that journalists have access to the child itself in other words to the source. So the way in which Britons British the British media is coverage has changed over the last decade is really very dramatic. First of all, it became very interested in this subject, desperate for access to children, with a troubling story to tell, then it became very uninterested in the experience of children who live in adversity. And in stories of victimization and depression, then it became very interested in another kind of victimized person the accused adults. So in the early nineties, we were awash with stories that were interesting into respect. First of all, because they're transformed our sense of who is victimized by who, but secondly, they told us a great deal about what, what drives the tellable NUS. If you like of a story here were accused adults who, of course, you know, like me, or, you know, you're, you're you and I made, I've lost all track of time and everything.

Beatrix Campbell (00:13:25):

No, I'm not McKenzie Wark that's you sure. So what we've, what we've witnessed in, in the course of this decade is that there's the metamorphosis of a victimization and victims in, in ways that the, the mass media has been completely crucial to the final thing I want to just allude to is the paradoxical relationship of the mass media to the Royal family. One of the things that I thought was completely riveting about the tabloids relationship to the Royal family, which was generally speaking, treated in a kind of smoggy way by the broadsheet media and particularly by television, who felt that the tabloids were just interested in soap opera, you know, which of course there's nothing. What they completely misread was that first of all, the mass media is fast. The tumbleweeds fascination with sex, with human interest, with soaps, give them a wedge into the most dramatic story in the, in the house of Windsor in the 20th century, precisely because they were interested in the sexual maneuvers of the Royal family, that then led them to an extraordinary territorial contest with the Royal family that was at the core was at its core, a democratic contest, because what was at stake was the mass medias attempt to, if you'd like to push the limits of what the Royal family could control, allow to be known and determine what was knowable about them.

Beatrix Campbell (00:15:12):

And that's all I'm going to say. Well, adequate, I would have thought

Speaker 1 (00:15:23):

I regard the McKenzie walkers, the Luke Skywalker of new media, and he's going to take us into it. I suspect at warp speed, would you be kind enough to, so do Fasten your seatbelts first? Let me check this microphone is working. Is it working? I don't think so. Is that better? Yeah. So he's media savvy check the mic first. I think I'd rather be the mad max of whatever then the Luke Skywalker. And I know you don't think it's a great Australian movie, but I do. I thought it was brilliant and disgusting.

McKenzie Wark (00:15:58):

Well, another time.

McKenzie Wark (00:16:00):

Okay. Who should we believe you should believe me?

McKenzie Wark (00:16:05):

Trust me.

McKenzie Wark (00:16:06):

I know what's best. Don't listen to anybody else. I have authority from on high don't listen to the others, put all your trust in me. So I might run the authoritarian view of the relation between knowledge and power. It's the view, for example, with Plato's ideal Republic, in which the guardians preside over education culture and the flow of information or Republic from which famously artists and poets are with a few exceptions band, nobody who makes things up is allowed there only people who, who are the guardians decide what is an adequate representation of the truth. Now there's another view of the relationship between knowledge and power. And I think it's Hannah Arendt's view, for example, and it's also based on classical sources, although it's profoundly anti Platonist don't trust, priestly or political authority, trust your own judgment. Nobody has a special relationship to the truth that should take

precedence over the view of others automatically everyone's views are partial, motivated by desire and interest.

McKenzie Wark (00:17:09):

And yet we are not in that context without hope for approximation to the truth. The truth is what emerges when everyone with a view has had their say and people judge that that truth may lie somewhere between the views expressed rather than wholly on, on the part of one. And of course we may never find what is true in the strict sense, but we may be able to approximate it for the time being, because let's face it. Most of us don't have the luxury of philosophers to be able to debate this forever. We need to know now what we think is true so we can act now we're in source for this alternate Republic was the Athenian policy. And this Republic is based on the res Publica, the public thing, or to gloss it differently. The public reality truth is, is a construct arrived at, by a public and collective process in a rents thinking now our rent was not unaware of the dangers of, in a sense to democratic practice of truth making and indeed Plato had good reasons to fear absolute democracy.

McKenzie Wark (00:18:12):

He lived through some of the worst accesses over Theni and ultra democracy, which was fickle, impatient, punitive, and aggressive. The Athenians would have loved and embraced Slobodan Milosevic in their worst moments. So there, there are times when democracies can be a danger to themselves. The white noise of xenophobia is miracle ANSYS called it, called it this morning, you know, is I think perhaps always present in a democracy, but when democracies reach a military or economic crisis, often that view prevails if there is not the wisdom of hindsight some, some other kind of institutional mix to steer a majority away from that course. So of course, what most Republican political thinkers have wanted for centuries in a sense not to abolish democracy, but to temperate because the thing about democracy is it does have that tendency if left to its own devices to actually shut down the re public or the search for the public thing tyrannies can result from democracies, foregoing their own rights of, of finally acquiescing to the demagogue who says trust only me.

McKenzie Wark (00:19:23):

So in a sense, the difficulty is to keep open the tension between different kinds of points of view the conflict between the different ways of seeing things. Now, the reason I've sort of framed it in this kind of classical way is it says to say that none of our problems with the media, I think really all that new, we may get caught up in some particularly fashionable ideas about solutions. You might notice the fashion these days is to talk endlessly in Australia about the ownership of media and also about technology as if these were the two magic keys to answering all the questions about about media and media form. And it just always struck me as a poor argument that by diversifying diversifying ownership, we somehow automatically also diversify the content of the media as someone who spends quite a bit of time in newspaper archives.

McKenzie Wark (00:20:11):

They actually don't see a lot of evidence that when ownership was more diverse, that the content was more diverse or in some way better. In fact, I keep wondering when the golden age of journalism was, you know, you go back and you look through the archives and you read the utter crap that people wrote in the 1920s, the 1950s, you kind of wonder, you know, perhaps it's always been thus now there may be good business reasons why the consolidation of media ownership takes place. And unfortunately those reasons are likely to prevail in this country you know, whether we like it or not and will influence the

politics of media regulation. And I used to have a sneaking suspicion that media proprietors, quite like the fact that the, the debate is only ever about ownership. This is the only component that anybody ever see seems to worry about it because they know at the end of the day the better argument would probably not prevail and let's face it.

McKenzie Wark (00:21:03):

Cross media ownership, laws are a cake and ineffective when at the moment they actually do not prevent for example, Kerry packer setting up an entirely new internet based media service. I mean, just sort of it slips through all the cracks. You could set that up and then sell it to you know different interests and neither the cross-media ownership nor control of foreign ownership will necessarily impact on that. We also tend to ignore that the packer interests own most of the major magazines in Australia, and that magazine's nearest competitor. I there's no regulatory attention to that really whatsoever. There is an obsession with an incredibly narrow range of audiences and range of media technology. So clearly that regulatory environment is not working and will not work in the near future, but any in any way, maybe a more appropriate legal regulatory goal might be to address issues of content directly rather than indirectly through the regulation of ownership. What I think we need is an independent press council with the power to actually order certain things to take place when breaches, unfortunately, the problem with that argument is persuading journalists, that it is also in their interests. I mean, one thing we're journalists tend to line up with proprietors is in not wanting to be subject to that kind of public scrutiny that does actually have some power to actually order something the press council, of course, doesn't have those kinds of powers.

McKenzie Wark (00:22:27):

And of course, some argue that the technology will come to the rescue and none of this is really a problem. And we're moving from the era of mass consolidated media. The internet is, is disbursed, desegregated media, completely different from the mass media of the broadcast age. These are people who have obviously not studied the history of radio. For example, we started out as exactly a desegregated local differentiated media and look where it ended up, you know, kind of 40, 50 years down the track. So I think we were already starting to see that there's nothing necessarily implied in the technology that guarantees it's, that it remains a desegregated form. The economic principles have returned to scale. It seemed to me apply just as much on the worldwide web as they do in television or radio.

McKenzie Wark (00:23:14):

So, you know, I don't think we can rely on technology to save us. So perhaps we need to think a little more creatively about what are the kinds of institutional solutions. So, one thing I'm suggesting if we look at the regulatory framework why not separate regulation of content from regulation of ownership, because it strikes me that regulating ownership doesn't necessarily create the kind of regulation of content that it is, is just assumed that will follow. Now, it's a good thing that the ABC moved quickly into the online environment, but ABC online is not a well resourced national media outlet, no matter how sort of wonderfully farsighted it's it's setting up may have been, but say my heretical proposal for public media. And don't shout me down before I give you a reason for this. It's actually the privatized ABC television and spend the proceeds of the sale, making SBS the major national television network.

McKenzie Wark (00:24:11):

Thank you. So we still have it ABC online, which is a wonderfully forward-looking and proactive institution with no money. We still have ABC radio, which I think has done a wonderful job of realizing that national broadcasting actually means all these quite specific audiences. Whereas television still has this mindset that there is such a thing as broadcasting when we are clearly knee-deep in the post broadcast age already, SPS was set up as a special broadcast to read, actually understands that it is not speaking to the nation. Now we know for a fact that the ABC is not a national broadcast. What we have to do is look at the Nielsen ratings that the people who manage it have on their desk every day, it is a middle-class middle-aged middlebrow institution. It is not broadcasting for everyone is I'm sorry. It's just a fact. Now, of course, we all love sea change. I mean, it's a wonderful show,

McKenzie Wark (00:25:00):

But

McKenzie Wark (00:25:02):

It just, it happens to be exactly the same as Northern exposure. Why is no one ever pointed this out? It's just point for point copied from another show. It's exactly what we always, you know, accused the American network programs of doing of just cloning, a successful formula. And you know, I particularly love wild side, but you know, here it is perpetuating this sort of ancient mythology that bad things only happen in the inner city crime doesn't happen in the suburbs. It only happens in the inner city. We're an actually the belief of most people and it's true in Adelaide or even more true in Sydney or Melbourne. The demographic shift is from suburb to city. There was a whole movement taking place in where Australians live and how Australians live that I've never seen mentioned on the ABC. So the ABC is I'm afraid of a very sick and terminally ill animal.

McKenzie Wark (00:25:48):

It needs a bullet to the head and put out of its misery right now, such that now when we fought, we believe in is public broadcasting, then we should have good public casting. Why are we always put into this false dichotomy of you must offend the ABC because the alternative is nothing. We just privatized everything. Well, why don't we have a good public broadcast? So rather than a second rate, public private. Gotcha. So I think it's important to maintain a mix of commercial and public interest media and a mix of popular and elite media. It's just that our current institutions and regulations not necessarily guarantee it. I don't see why we should be forced into the dichotomy of defending institutions and regulations that are clearly working less and less well or open slather. Anything goes, let's reinvent the regulatory and public interest agenda in the media, starting from first principles, rather than always being put in, put in the position of defend organizations, which clearly like ABC television. I am no prepared to publicly defend, you know, they're not doing their job as far as I'm concerned that it's a brain dead institution.

McKenzie Wark (00:26:52):

Well, I'm sorry, that's my view. It will always be a market driven media. That's driven by popular demand, but popular the popular mood can be a fickle thing. And I think there is a role as someone who is, you know, a Democrat by instance, by Bankler nation. There is still a role for investing in, in attempting to create a wiser and perhaps even dare I say more elite media alongside that one that can look back and it's not necessarily always just caught up in the mood of the moment because we've known, as I said, since the fourth century BC, that there is a problem with, with just the kind of the democratic model of media, I want to flag him for why the market or not to be left solely to its own

devices. I would suggest. So by all means let's continue doing what I think Australian media regulation has always done recently. Well, which is to create a mix of different models different kinds of ways of gauging what constitutes could media, but let's not fall into the trap of it's open slather. Anything goes, or we have to defend the existing regulatory environment and institutions because it seems to me that I don't think they're working now, but I think even people who think they're working now would have grave doubts about whether they're going to work five years, 10 years, 20 years into the future. Okay. [inaudible]

Speaker 1 (00:28:20):

Typical McKenzie Wark vacillating. [inaudible], can't get The bloody, you know, really gutsy performance out of it. You better come onto those things. And so just think back and say, well, one of the things he said was that what was crap in the fifties? That's when I started writing newspaper columns. And shortly thereafter, I started saying it was an awful shame that academia among other things didn't take popular culture. Seriously. I wrote universities to start selling film, television, and popular culture. Little did I know that a little later on they'd do almost nothing else except study popular culture, which brings us to princess Leia and who studies it with enormous energy. She tells me, I read, I read a pseudo of sleep that I've got to take Oprah Winfrey opera Winfrey. Very seriously. She tells me that I don't do it, but but you tells us very good reason. I don't know what angle she's going to take today, but I would be very surprised if it wasn't a commitment to popular culture in all its glory.

Catherine Lumby (00:29:28):

Thanks for listening. And I was actually wondering after Ken's speech, whether Christopher Pearson was here, taking notes, be interesting to see what happens there to help us prepare for our papers this session. The organizers were thoughtful enough to provide us with a series of questions on this enormous topic. And I was very pleased to say that these questions corresponded exactly to the themes and issues I address in my new book. Gotcha. So the 1695, the answers to the questions posed in the briefing paper, I'm happy to report. Yes, no. And maybe it should be more specific. Actually the topic we've been throwing today is obviously so large that you know, we can do no more than, nor in a small corner of it. So today I think I'll look at the relationship between communal truth and the media and interrogate. What I think is still a common belief that if the media was functioning properly in a liberal democracy, it would work as a tool for the development of an informed public consensus.

Catherine Lumby (00:30:38):

That's a very fourth estate view of the media's role. Now I should say at the outset that my views on the media are inseparable from my views on the way contemporary Dimock democracy functions in the Western world, and perhaps how I think it ought to function. And to put this in brief, I'm a post liberal meaning I'm critical of the liberal assumptions, which underpin both leftist and conservative views on contemporary culture and politics. The rude way of putting this is to call me a post-modernist, which is an increasingly meaningless term of abuse, but one which can, and I at least share together now to explain what I mean by post liberalism, I post liberalism in my definition involves a fundamental objection to one of the founding claims or myths of liberalism, namely that communities or nations in democratic societies should aspire to a vision of unity or to put it another way.

Catherine Lumby (00:31:39):

That core common values ground contemporary democracy in Australia at present, we're witnessing a heated struggle in the name of ordinary Australians. By both the major political parties, both the liberal

and labor parties are big on claims to speak for and to the average mainstream working person and to represent their values. And it's a picture of our society, which suggests that whatever our individual differences or group differences, the majority of us can be unified by common concerns and beliefs. Now I dispute this absolutely this fictional unity goes to the heart of liberal conceptions of democracy. And it's a fiction I'd argue that is being thoroughly eroded and exposed. Partly through the interaction between the media and democracies in late capitalist society, the insistence on unity or civic consensus or values call them what you will is the very thing that predetermines the limits to the liberal conception of democracy, or rather limits democracy within a liberal conception. And I think it also, you know, inherently limits cultural diversity, it sets limits to difference, and it defines how difference will be assigned if you like in our society. The liberal conception of democracy is a conception which allows or tolerate differences as long as there's an unspoken social pact about which groups are considered different or other, and which groups represent the broad represent the broader community interests and values. In simple terms, it's a philosophy which has founded on hidden claims about which minorities matter so efficiently to constitute a majority.

Catherine Lumby (00:33:34):

The notion that the media at its best should work in the public interest by bringing us objective accounts of issues, which, which mattered to us all is inextricably bound up with this liberal idea about democracy. The public interest is in fact code for the interests. And I hear I can cope with Mackenzie about ABC TV for the interest of an educated and generally well-off class of citizens who believe their values and tastes are neutral. Similarly, the notion of objectivity is code for a set of journalistic conventions and values, which reflect a class-based preference for certain media formats, modes of presentation, and a hierarchy of certain issues. I could say a lot more on this, but I'm not going to, I don't have time. I'm just going to give you an example. The OJ Simpson trial is what I'm going to use here to talk about democracy and media, and as proof of Phillip's contention that Mackenzie and I are the same person.

Catherine Lumby (00:34:33):

I researched this remarkable media event when I was attached to NYU. But I'm sure, you know, most Australians are very familiar with the OJ Simpson child. You didn't have to be there to kind of witness. It was a global event from the police chase of OJ since then apparently fleeing LA in his infamous Ford Bronco, which was watched by 95 million Americans alone to the jury verdict on October 3rd, 1995 watched by 150 million Americans. Every detail at the OJ Simpson arrest preliminary hearing and murder trial was televised often live and revisited in mind, numbing detail by legal experts, media commentators, and people close to the events. And the OJ Simpson trial was far more than news. It furnished TV and print media with gossip, celebrities, political and social analysis, comedy and above all entertainment. And so in this sense, I think it was, you know, a truly representative of media event.

Catherine Lumby (00:35:39):

The Simpson trial may have been physically located in a courtroom in Los Angeles, but in real terms, it took place in American's lounge rooms. Despite the fact that the jury took only four hours to find Simpson not guilty on both counts of murder and national Newsweek poll found that 54% of white Americans disagreed with the good. Now, one of the things that happened immediately after this ch the verdict came down was enormous like a kind of media culpa and normal. It was kind of outpouring of guilt by media commentators about the media's role in supposedly misleading in the public and publicizing the trial and fueling many commentators concerns about this intense scrutiny of the trial

were fears that the narrow judicial issues had been swallowed up in a kind of media circus, which had influenced Americans. The majority of white Americans may have seen the jury decision as a travesty of justice, that 85% of black Americans surveyed in the same Newsweek poll agreed with a not guilty finding at the heart of this split is something more than race allegiance.

Catherine Lumby (00:36:54):

It's a fundamental schism in the way black and white Americans relate to their legal and political systems to put it simply. I think they live in different countries for me, any educated white Americans, the court system remains a cornerstone of democracy, a repository of reason, and enlightened adjudication for many black Americans, educated and middle class or not. The American legal system is an enduring symbol of inequity and oppression. The media coverage of the Simpson trial allowed this disparity to be aired at an unprecedented national level. The Simpson trial heroine heralded a new era in justice, an era in which public opinion took precedence over a spec for judicial process, an era in which the courtroom and the lounge room was seamlessly linked. Now, obviously this tickle of the media, reflecting on its role in events, isn't new. I think what was different about the post Simpson trial autopsy was the palpable note of shock, which rang through the holes of us media punditry. And it was very, it was instantly clear that white, liberal commentators who had some reason to believe they sympathized with black Americans were at a loss to understand the deep divisions between the way black and white Americans view the trial. And what I think happened was that this fiction, this liberal fiction of consensual civic truth, it was blowing wide open and that the media was the kind of forum in which this happened. [inaudible]

Catherine Lumby (00:38:26):

Objectivity, impartiality and reasoned and informed debate are all catchphrases. You can find in plenty of textbooks on journalism and the justice. The law has its reasonable man. The person whose eyes, jurors and judges are often invited to see events, true journalists, have their fictional Joe public, the average reader, or the ordinary bloke, a person with common sense who wants to be informed. But doesn't B doesn't like to be told what to think. Both the modern media and the common law have their roots in the enlightenment and both have evolved as key institutions in our public sphere. A free press is widely seen as a cornerstone of Western democracy, the symbol Tania's independence and interdependence of the press, the parliament, the courts, and the executive is in theory, meant to guarantee the democratic character of the public sphere. And that the journalistic ideal of objectivity is crucial to this concept of a democratic public sphere.

Catherine Lumby (00:39:30):

Yet as both the Rodney king video tape and the gavel to gavel coverage of the Simpson chart trial showed even unedited video footage of an event, doesn't produce a definitive version of events. It produces representation's to war over the contemporary media. Then don't simply report on events. They help produce them. They always did so, but I think this is just simply become clearer. The intensive nature of media coverage makes it, it makes it impossible for anyone to claim that it's possible to cleanly separate many high profile events from the way they are represented in the media. It follows them. It's also impossible to judge media coverage solely by the veracity or objectivity with which it represents an event. It's not only the distance between the media and real events or have all but disappeared, but that the illusion of a unified viewing point vanished with it, which is where I link this back to the question of democracy, different interest groups, and individuals can watch the same images and draw wildly

different conclusions in the 1997, Australian water front dispute, for instance, an infamous infamous photograph showed sobbing.

Catherine Lumby (00:40:46):

Children caught between police and unionists and both sides attempted to use this as propaganda in their own cause. And of course the Rodney king video tape is a great example of that unedited video footage which didn't convince the duty jury to find job the police guilty of assault writing about the OJ Simpson trial media theorist. John Fiske argues that the jury no longer provides the objective transcendent truth of the reasonable man. Now, a jury has representatives not of human rationality, but if it's immediate society and its truth cannot be separated from the ways in which that society struggles to understand its own experience. The OJ Simpson trial heralded I'd argue the return of everything. The liberal public sphere sought to repress the legal fictions, which lawyers have worked comfortably with for centuries, the reasonable man and the objective juror stand exposed as just that fictions, which enable the law to ignore the way issues like gender and race have affected the equality of treatment individuals receive before the law. What the televising of high profile cases such as the Simpson trial has also made clear to most Americans is that the world of the courtroom has a lot more in common with the world of the media. The most lawyers like to admit the courts have always been forums for performance and spin doctoring, but even in the courtroom, the real war has always been a war over representation

Speaker 2 (00:42:29):

[Inaudible]

Speaker 1 (00:42:29):

And now David Brooks will prove that the idea of a witty conservative it's not an oxymoron. David is lethally what he had discovered when we chatted on the wild west. And I should remind you that he's the senior editor of the Washington journal, the weekly standard, a contributing editor at Newsweek. And I think he published in almost every other significant broadsheet. Haven't you? He's also, as I said, loved and hated amongst conservatives, we printed out a whole bunch of stuff in response to Vinson essay that I mentioned. And boy, did you whip up a storm? David? Who should we believe? Well, I guess I come to all questions on the media having survived first, the OJ year, and then the Monica Lewinsky year. And my impulse is who cares? I don't want to talk about it. The media is not worth discussing and I'm going to stick to that because I think that our initial impulse is correct especially the who cares question, because I think the power of the media is something that's vastly easy to overstate or to simplify.

David Brooks (00:43:36):

The Lewinsky scandal broke on a Wednesday. We call it Monica day in Washington because it had a, it was like the a nuclear bomb went off. We'd been watching this OJ trial, this sex and murder trial in Los Angeles. Enviously being pushed off the front pages. And suddenly we had our own sex trial sex in Washington, clearly a once in a century event. And so we were suddenly, our phones were ringing. We were called to the TV studios to pun to ties. And we were to arrive in these green rooms that were filled with pundits and they swept us on and off studios in threes like lines and a hockey team just coming and going. And it was just a dump on Clinton, not only that first day, but for the entire year, no man has ever absorbed a more negative and more virulent attack on his character from the media.

David Brooks (00:44:31):

And, you know, the media is in the U S as in many places is sort of moderately left. I think the 91% of journalists or journalists in Washington voted for bill Clinton in 92. And I probably again in 96, but the people who are for whom were the most virulent against him, it was just a massive dump on the guy for an entire year. So what happens to his public approval ratings? Well, of course they go up. So what's the power of the media in the time since the media is pretty much left bill Clinton alone, they've been dumping on the Republicans who have just been doing a terrible job, trying to run the legislative branch. So what's happened to the Republicans public approval ratings. They've skyrocketed. If you look, if the next election were held today, the Republican presidential putative candidate, George W. Bush would win by 15 points.

David Brooks (00:45:25):

The Republicans would be returned to majority in the legislature. Nobody can explain it except for the fact that we in the media were against them, or at least predominantly the same is true for Reagan. Reagan was disliked by most of the media. He's now after Franklin Roosevelt, the most popular president in the century. This hit me on a more profound sense. A few weeks ago, I went to a conference in Michigan of people who research sex. And it was interesting first for the reason that I never had so many boring conversations about sex in my life, but, but second because of the way that they've studied sex over the century, and, you know, we all think, or at least I thought going in that sexual habits patterns changed dramatically with the sexual revolution. And their claim was that this was largely a media event.

David Brooks (00:46:12):

Nudity and sexual discussion was changed radically in the sixties and seventies. What could be said in newspapers, what could be shown in movies, but they say, if you want to know what habits changed when practices changed, when frequency change, it all has to do with the two world wars, not the sixties and seventies, not the putative sexual revolution. And that the lesson you have to draw from that is that reality matters that the world wars created real destruction, real disruption in people's lives, which really affected the way they actually behave. But the media transformation, the sixties and seventies had a much less immediate effect on them. The same is true of pornography since which has skyrocket in the U S pornography consumption while sexual patterns have stayed equal or gone down. At least if you measure frequency. So I think, you know, we, we can't draw a simple direct line and the influence of the media is just not easily discernible.

David Brooks (00:47:07):

But even if the media is important, I'm still disinclined to talk about it. My first job was I was a reporter for a wire service in Chicago called the city news bureau, which is a legendary starting ground for a lot of journalists. You cover rapes and murders and things. And my first day on the job I was asked to first of all, a teenager committed suicide. So I, so I had to call all his neighbors and find out why. And the second, my second story was a city mid-level official was killed in a car crash. So I had to call the wife and find out what he was like. And they said, well, say I heard your husband was a generous man. And that supposedly gets people talking. I never, since that day, I've had trouble taking the phrase, journalistic ethics too seriously. And yet there's an entire industry in the U S devoted to studying and talking about journalism. There's an Institute at Harvard and various other places, and journalists go up there and whip themselves with feathers over various misdeeds. It's sort of the epicenter of pomposity

in, in Washington or in America, the only people more insufferable than journalists who navel gaze are academics, former journalists who become academics, who enable gaze.

David Brooks (00:48:16):

So I'm really disinclined to talk about the media. I just, I'm not sure what of interest can be said, but I would like to use the remainder of my time to try to raise what I think is a more interesting question, which is about how the relationship between intellectuals in the media has changed over the past generation or so. In 1954, Irving Howe wrote an essay in partisan review called outrage of conformism. His basic point was that intellectual arrows are best when they're most Bohemian, when the intellectual separate themselves from society, go off away from society and judge society from a realm that's above in a realm that's universal realm of universal ideas and truths when they are not involved in society. And this was really how the whole partisan review crowd saw itself. It was sorta like the way the Russian intelligentsia saw itself as a secular priesthood, which would look at society, not as actors and participants, but in a realm of universal ideas.

David Brooks (00:49:14):

And when you look back on that partisan review, that whole intellectual crowd was, it must have been an incredibly exciting time when you were read the memoirs, they would, they would talk as if a book review could change the world. They had these big grand topics, Reno Reinhold Niebuhr wrote a book called the nature and destiny of man, which covers a lot of ground. But you know, it was, it was it was a time of incredible intensity. And one of the things they did most viciously was to preserve the buffer between themselves and what we now call the media how in this essay was alarmed because he saw his fellow intellectuals taking jobs in the media, writing for magazines, working for government, getting affluent going off and talking at conferences. Well he wrote at one point in full lamentation writers today often have no choice, but to write for the new Yorker and worse, far worse.

David Brooks (00:50:13):

And his argument was that occasionally a writer will write for the new Yorker and not see his or her mind destroyed. And he was writing for the same magazine that Hannah rent road for partisan review. And she had written for the new Yorker. So he made that one exception for her, but he said, 11 out of 12 get destroyed by it. Their minds freeze up, they become, they just become co-opted or whatever. And he and his crowd attacked middlebrow culture with a viciousness that takes our breath away. It started back with Virginia Wolf who called it the sickly slime. And then it goes on to Dwight McDonald and all these people in the intellectuals who called it the menace of the gates, because they felt that high culture was cheapened by middlebrow culture. And by middlebrow culture, they were talking about things like the museum of modern art.

David Brooks (00:50:57):

They were talking about what for us will be public radio and public television. They saw these things as menaces as the encroachments of commercial society. Well, it's a good thing. Urban kind of wasn't around today because today nobody worries if they see their favorite intellectual in the new Yorker or on TV, particularly today, you know, universities, blast fax PR releases out to all us journalists, desperate to get their sociologists on television. Today I was the editor of a national newspaper in the states, and I used to get that's where we published the essays for outsiders. I got a 150 essays a day to look at 60 phone calls a day, normous outpouring of think tankers and academics and intellectuals, trying to get

their word products on the pages. It was like just a re river coming at me, a lot of lawyers to probably billing the hours.

David Brooks (00:51:50):

And so the epidemic, the sort of epic, well, the typical intellectual of the day is a guy, for example, Henry Louis Gates, who the chairman of the African-American studies at Harvard, who has a picture of Quincy Jones on his office as his hero, Quincy Jones, sort of the media mogul music and film mogul, and, you know, Henry Louis Gates. He signs contracts with magazines, like talk on the new Yorker to write books. He's got encyclopedias that he puts out under his sort of his empire. He appears on television, he signs network contracts, radio contracts. He's got a million balls in the air and he's, he's like an intellectual entrepreneur. And it's the same with many other intellectuals who are getting on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, our public flagship talk station. And now we don't think anything of it. And I wonder what Irving, whether Irvin kind of was right or wrong.

David Brooks (00:52:41):

And I really don't know the answer to this. So it's bad to start a question if you don't have the answer, but it seems to me that what's gained throughout the intellectual greater involvement in media, in the world and television, all that is sort of a greater access to reality. It does, if you're doing a story for a magazine, or if you're on TV a lot, you do meet a lot of people. You wouldn't ordinarily meet the partisan review crowd. We're living on the upper west side of Manhattan in a very tight, small circle. Very insular knew nothing about the greater, the wider America. And I think it makes you more accurate. The, the fifties intellectuals had these sweeping statements, these wild conspiracy theories, which really had no relation to politics and governance the day simply because they knew no good people in government.

David Brooks (00:53:23):

They knew nobody in Washington until a guy named Daniel, Patrick Moynihan came in in the sixties. What's lost though, is the sweep. And the quality of the writing that came out in the fifties from those intellectuals, what's lost is the intensity as we all become sort of intellectual entrepreneurs or as people who are real intellectuals becoming intellectual entrepreneurs, I think there is something lost there. And it's something I don't know. I don't know if we'll ever go back to a, an era like partisan review, where, where the media does not dominate where TV in particular does not dominate discussion and public discourse. But it's something we should think about.

Speaker 2 (00:54:10):

[Inaudible],

Speaker 1 (00:54:10):

It's not question time in the house of reps and the Senate, the microphones here and here, is there one upstairs or did we not expect to a capacity crowd? There is one upstairs on the, on the right legend gentlemen, would you please come to the microphones? You don't have to identify yourself. It's up to you, but make the questions brief and sparkling. And if you like aim them at one of the distinguished panelists. So I a frequent user of the internet. I know, I know about newsgroups. So my question is do you feel, do you feel, and I'm sorry I've forgotten your name, but yes, yes. Do, do you feel that as, as we start as, as, as more and more people get onto the introducing it the newsgroups will treat a critical mess and then become sort of a separate media almost in themselves.

McKenzie Wark (00:55:17):

The thing about the internet is it's already a mass media. I can remember you know, about five years ago, I, I wrote a column in which I occasionally mentioned that there were 20 million people were using the internet and the Savita it's just assumed it was a mistake and made it 2 million you know, and it's like, that was just how, how, how unreal that, that, you know, the sort of concept of the fact that, you know, on global scales is already a mass media, but in each specific country, it's, it's going to be a fairly restricted elite media in terms of who's got access to not just the technology, but the training to actually use it properly. But in a sense that was it ever, I mean, there was always a level of of media that only a few people would use.

McKenzie Wark (00:55:57):

But the, the form of a technology doesn't necessarily determine what people will do with it, but it makes certain things possible. And one interesting thing that the internet has made possible is things like newsgroups and discussion where it's not, it's no longer you just read stuff. And when it really sort of you off, you write a letter to the editor, which they won't publish anyway, you know it's, you know, even the New York times, for example, is God, it's it's space where you can sort of argue, wait, your heart's content. And a lot of people seems to be preferred to do that and actually read the paper. So it's, it's, it's, it's not determined by the technology we just made possible by it. So yes, there are new kind of democratic spaces opening up in that. Unfortunately, the argument in Australia is always about, you know, oh, isn't it terrible?

McKenzie Wark (00:56:41):

We've got the engineered because there's all this porn and hate hate groups using it. Well, yes, that's true. But we tend not to then, you know, so then we get into a punitive mode of like, oh, we have to stop these things and shut them down without going, well, actually that's kind of democracy at work, you know? And so we don't really tend to think constructively about how we could use that emerging space which, which is, as I say, already, a mass media. So yes, look, I'm a quick Digger, Adelaide advertiser. It's just the daily newsletter for the liberal part. If you go to the press club, you'll find it's a branch meeting of the liberal party. But my, my, my depression is it's mostly the Orwellian lying on the opiate drugs. Now this has been going on for a hundred years or more.

Speaker 1 (00:57:29):

Why don't the press published the pharmacological truth about the opiates that is, are extraordinary, gentle and safe drugs. If they are a pure, they are non-toxic expose the Orwellian laws. It's religiously basis, not pharmacologically biasly drug laws, going back to the 1850s from the whales or groups of the authoritarian, Wells or groups. I mean, you can talk Peto the laws on the opiates quite simply by exposing the Orwellian lies and telling the pharmacological truth. Now, this is a bit technical, it's a bit different, a bit different from we get the gist. However, why doesn't the press tell the public, the pharmacological truth about the opioids and taught torpedo. They all Welly on laws? Well, I would've thought that the press had been telling the truth about many people in the Britain region and even William F. Buckley Jr. Has been telling the truth. Has he not in the U S about, well, he's been high most of the time. So

Catherine Lumby (00:58:30):

That's I take that back if I could just like very briefly respond to that. I mean, you know, one of the things you've got to ask on any issue you could pick is, you know, who's the constituency. And I mean, if you

look at broadsheet newspapers, I mean, I think they, they publish a lot of rubbish about drugs. It's youth bashing rubbish, actually, you know, essentially that the trick or the technique is to you know, find out what young people are calling an old drug today. What's the new name and then, you know, find a doctor to get panicked about it and proclaim the end of Western civilization as we know it well, that's because of the demographic, you know, that newspapers are kind of targeted at people, you know, over 35 who might have kids themselves and, you know, invested in youth back.

David Brooks (00:59:14):

It's it's no longer appropriate in polite company to demonize yeah. Blacks, Asians, or Jews, but it seems to me the drug users, one of the last categories that you can, sorry, what you like about which, which I think is a great shame. I'm all in favor of the regulated legalization of substances. But, but getting people out of the mindset of, well, we have to blame some last minority somewhere as well. I think the X-Files countries, the X-Files is great. We can blame it all on the aliens cause they don't exist. You know, they're the bad guys. Let's just demonize them and let everybody else get on with their lives, whether they're black or gay or Asian or drag,

Catherine Lumby (00:59:54):

Madam, my question or statement is directed to, yeah, I am very sorry. I'm directing this to McKinsey McKinsey. I don't think you live in the real world, sweetie. Sorry. Sorry. Could you try it? Yeah. Well, what I was saying to McKinsey again, I say, sweetie, I don't think he live in the real world. The ABC mine may be government controlled. However, if you listen, after, after GST, the triple J actually had it orchestrated against the GST. So, so, so I liked the ABC the way it is underfunded, definitely underfunded, but I like it the way it is. If it was privatized. It would be gone under complete and utter Jewish control. It's bad enough as it is now. It's bad enough as it is now. So excuse me, excuse me. We live in a democracy. We live, we live in a democracy, please. I'm allowed to give my opinion the same as the five people up there, but anyway, McKinsey, although I really did enjoy your speech, I do. I do think

David Brooks (01:01:28):

I'd be, the argument was let's prioritize the ABC, but give the money to SBS and start again. So, you know, all those things we love about the ABC, you know, I think we would survive without someone sort of brain dead administrative overload. The television there is burdened with I mean, there are wonderful programmers at the ABC, a wonderful program makers, but there are many, many more X program makers who no longer work there. And you know, they're the people that are more inclined to listen to, you know, let's, let's get public broadcasting, right. We don't have to defend institutions just because they happen to be there. Let's make new ones, which was in a sense why SPS was started. It's just never quite been allowed to fulfill its it's it's, you know, full charter. It needs room to grow. Is there a question from the Senate, from the upper house there? Isn't okay. Madam your turn. Thank you. Would you please I'm about this, but very little clarity up here. It's terribly hard. It's like trying to translate the dead sea scrolls. Can you, can you hear me, if you speak slowly, speak

Catherine Lumby (01:02:30):

Slowly. That's difficult for me. Far more pragmatic question than the last two question and comment to, to Catherine Lumby. Your talk was a great sort of 10 minutes summary of, you know, the best of, of media studies, 1 0 1 courses. You know, I mean, I should say that I'm a, you know, an ex sort of media studies, mass communications student. So I certainly agree with much of what you said, but I feel that, that that there's so much more to be said at times, like now, namely, what would you suggest other

than sort of deconstructing appropriately, you know, liberal universalism and those sorts of values and the lack of diversity, the lack of diversity of voices in the media, what ways would you suggest practical mechanisms for particularly young you know, media workers to, to actually begin to reshape the sorts of values that we get and to make different sorts of voices and representations.

Speaker 1 (01:03:42):

Yeah, I think we get the, get the drift. Catherine,

Catherine Lumby (01:03:45):

This is a very large question. I mean, I'd say two things to that. One is, and this is where I'm, I guess I part company with some people on the left, I think that capitalism is a pretty radical kind of force. And I think that liberal democracy and capitalism has kind of carried the seeds of its own undoing in terms of the greater pluralism and a kind of radicalization of difference or have spaces for different voices. And one of the places I see that happening in the media replaces that conventionally aren't looked at like the tabloid media. Interestingly, when they talked about just to use a concrete example here, when you talked about the, the role the tabloids played in drawing attention to the Royal family and into the story, the whole story of the kind of monarchy and what was happening there, I think that's important, but I also think stories about private lives.

Catherine Lumby (01:04:33):

So politicization of stories about sexuality, gender, and so forth that have circulated around people like princess Diana are equally important and have been revalued in those contexts. I also think the internet is a very important kind of model here for, as Ken talked about a more interactive form of media. So I think that what we're seeing is a lot is at a grassroots level media consumers becoming in small ways, media producers, and also a real diversification of the kinds of issues, which are raised in the mass media in which are politicized and publicized. That's the short answer,

Speaker 1 (01:05:11):

David, before I take another question from the fall, there's something I have to ask you about. I was terribly interested in your argument that American media is in a thick, counterproductive. It attacks Clinton. Clinton goes up very well up in the polls. No, I have never wanted to embrace American example, but that is one I'd like to embrace here because if, if that was the case, Paul Keating would still be prime minister. What about rush Limbaugh? Many people in the Republican party seem to believe that this particular shock jock was almost more important than the print media in its totality. He seemed that way. I'd say in 94, rush Limbaugh is the sort of the voice of angry white male. He became the epitome of and when the Republican swept to Congress in 1994, it seemed like here we had an old media which was speaking for the voiceless who were sort of the white males without college degrees, I would say.

David Brooks (01:06:08):

And, and that was part that was part of an age of, of of destruction. I would say that the central thrust of that moment, which he was perfectly attuned to was people thought Hillary Clinton and sort of big government was back on their backs and they were angry about it. And he spoke to that, but he only, he only spoke in one tone and now he still has a huge audience, but it's an he's out of step with the rest of America. We've gone from being very antiestablishment as a country and, and sort of as an angry out of temper to being a country, which is anxious and anxious about institutions, interested in preserving

institutions not wanting to be free from the hand of government, but wanting the hand of government to be sort of a comforting force, a soft embrace.

David Brooks (01:07:00):

And so Russlynn was still has the big audience, but he seems to have no actual effects with it. So his style of government, even within the Republican party is on the wane. I find that very comforting. So yeah, I'm mindful that in contesting or beliefs by dissidence in third world countries where mouth mouth of a word where word of mouth and face to face communication is still a lot more important that sometimes it's not unusual for dissidents to be assassinated. I'm just wondering whether the panel could comment on the idea that in developed nations, where we depend very much on institutions for our truths that it's quite possible to assassinate uncomfortable public figures by eliminating them from the broadcast headlines and also the newspaper headlines. The other aspect that I'd like members of the panel to comment on is the relationship between the spectacular success, public relations and news and current affairs, which in a very short space of time, it become key prime spots for all, all news and radio broadcasting. And that we, we were seeing that during election periods election campaigns have become the mother of all campaigns, that they have very little relationship with either party policy or public interest. We got once again, we've got to just split it up B the idea of the journalist and particularly in developing countries as the, as the brave loner coming out, expressing dissident views, risking everything being shot all too often, or jailed for his or her troubles. Can you talk to that briefly?

Catherine Lumby (01:09:01):

Well, I suppose it's a funny thing that journalists in what would be regarded as successful democracies aren't targets why, presumably because they're not dangerous full stop,

Speaker 1 (01:09:19):

That's almost enough of an answer as well. David, I'm glad this issue has been raised of public relations and advertising as a part of the whole thing in America often seems to me, at least at the gubernatorial level, the elections of auctions are becoming blurred. The cost of electioneering is so immense and issues are reduced to slogans or to image equations that prey, I think, on the, on the ignorance of the viewer, do you have another few to that? Yeah. Well, it's funny to watch the two candidates who are now raising money when you talk to the two campaigns that I'm talking about, George W. Bush on the Republican side and Al gore and the democratic side, they think money is all that matters that really, if you've got the money, then you're going to win. And there are plenty of counterexamples. There was a Texas governor named John Connolly who had all the money and he didn't win.

Speaker 1 (01:10:12):

So Forbes twos and I, Steve Forbes is, has all the money in the world and he's not gonna win. But it's funny, it's in the mindset in it. But what I would say, the money follows the polls. The reason people are giving all this money, and you can only give a thousand dollars, which in a lot of circles in America is not that much money these days. So people max out to both parties, but the reason they are giving to the money to these candidates is not because somebody woke up and say, you know, Al gore or George W. Bush his ideas are something I want to commit my life to. They're doing it because they're ahead in the polls and they want their party to win. So in a sense, the money does follow the polls. If I could have 30 seconds to about the first part of the question, because one of the most exciting moments in my life was covering the cl the fall of Soviet union.

David Brooks (01:10:57):

And my first several trips there, I took about 14 trips there of about two weeks each. And my first several trips were when Soviet union was still around and the dissonance and the intelligency were so vivid and exciting. And to talk to them, you got the searing insights into the situation. Then it fell. Yeltsin took over some sort of democracy took over and the intellectuals became cranky out of sorts, out of touch reality. They were in love with their VMs. They were in love with the purity of their ideas, and they were out of touch with the more mediocre and balancing reality that that then existed. It was interesting transformation, ladies and gentlemen, I've been given the windup, forgive me. We can't pose any more questions, but I'd like to think a provocative and unusually eclectic panel. Catherine Lumby, David Brooks, McKenzie Wark Beatrix Campbell.

Speaker 2 (01:11:52):

[Inaudible].